Growth drivers of middle-income transitional countries: The case of the Republic of Macedonia by Shukarov, Miroljub
GROWTH DRIVERS OF MIDDLE-INCOME
TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES:
THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Miroljub SHUKAROV
As the world is moving ahead, all national economies need to find their own development path. The
economic growth should be continually high enough to provide for a normal and growing standard
of living for the citizens and, at the same time, provide opportunities for introducing and engaging
the new, incoming generations in the world of business. The countries differ not only by the levels of
attained development standard, but also by the possible methods which might be used for accelerat-
ing growth.
The paper discusses growth factors which could help Macedonia find its way to catch up with the
developed world in the long run – if this is possible. Obviously, the importance of institutions under-
stood as the “rules of the game” and underpinning them is one of the most important issues related to
development that should be seen as a conditio sine qua non and a basic prerequisite of a “develop-
mental wave”.
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INTRODUCTION
Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz said, “In economics, you have to run to stand
still” (Stiglitz 2010: 63). He was right. The world is moving ahead and all the na-
tional economies need to find their own development path to advance compared
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with the countries in their own surroundings and, ultimately, with the rest of the
world. The first to be compared are the neighbouring countries.
Brief methodological remarks
The OLS and correlation analysis on the World Bank time-series database (from
1980 to 2011)1 are used for a deeper analysis and comparison. Special attention is
paid to the Global Development Indicators and the World Development Finance
Indicators. Some of the conclusions are based on the use of the Global Economic
Prospects Indicators, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Poverty and In-
equality Indicators, and the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys.
The context and a brief theoretical review
We are trying to discover the growth factors (Todaro – Smith 2009) in the long run
(Gathak 2003) that could help Macedonia find a way to catch up with the devel-
oped world. Before starting the analysis, we have to raise the most complex ques-
tion: is it possible?
Historical context could be seen initially, having in mind Rosenstein Rodan’s
Big Push Theory (Rosenstein Rodan 1943). He argued that underdeveloped coun-
tries require large amounts of investments (“a minimum level of resources that
must be devoted to […] a development program if it is to have any chance of suc-
cess”) to initiate their economic leap to the group of higher growth level countries,
or to avoid the low level equilibrium “trap”. Two decades earlier, Young argued
that faster economic growth should be the result of “increasing returns” (Young
1928). He tried to explain Adam Smith’s division of labour as a crucial growth
driver. In explaining different growth factors, he paid much attention to the size of
the market, the influence of the division of labour on productivity, and, as a conse-
quence, additional and deeper division of labour and growth of the universal level
of scientific knowledge. Many other theoreticians have tried to identify some of
the factors that influence economic prosperity.2
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1 http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4 (Accessed 20 August 2012)
2 E.g. Lewis 1954; Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Rostow 1960; Nurkse 1961; Gerschenkron 1962;
Marques – Saukiazis 1998; Rodik 2003; Barro – Sala i Martin 2004; Leydesdorff 2006.
Macedonia’s economic status
Countries are competing among themselves and are analysing, copying, or avoid-
ing the other countries’ success/failure experiences. First to be compared are the
neighboring countries, the countries with a similar economic history, especially
the countries which successfully passed the transition towards economic growth.
These countries could act as models for others on their course to define strategic
long-term priorities, having in mind their specificities and possibilities. One rule,
among many others, is that the growth rates of less developed countries should be
higher than those of developed ones. The countries differ not only by the levels of
the attained development standard, but also by the possible methods which might
be used for accelerating growth. Consequently, a more subtle analysis is neces-
sary to discover some of the specific growth drivers. According to the analysis of
the growth factors, so far Slovenia has been a good example to follow by some of
the former Yugoslav countries. But, in the meantime, Slovenia became a member
of the European Union with a GDP per capita that is several times higher than the
Macedonian one. Estonia is another country that would be more appropriate to
consider as a transition leader, whose policies and long-term priorities are realistic
and can be followed. It is one of the European Union countries with extraordinary
progress and a country whose progress could be considered as a result of a special
desire and commitment to catch up with the developed world.
Normally, the population is one of the main growth factors, which cannot be
neglected if the economy is capable of generating a sufficient number of jobs in
the private sector and if there is a normal (or excess) use of the capacities in the
economy. However, as that is not the case in Macedonia, we will analyse different
aspects of the economic structure of Macedonia and other selected countries.
We make some comparisons among the newest members of the European Un-
ion (Bulgaria and Romania); Macedonia’s neighboring countries (Albania and
Serbia); Croatia (both countries, i.e. Macedonia and Croatia, shared the same Yu-
goslav economic and political history), which has also joined the European Un-
ion; and Estonia, a small country (smaller than Macedonia) with extraordinary
progress in the post-transition period.
Macedonia is one of the poorest European countries and it is the poorest coun-
try in the region. Its GDP per capita is slightly higher than one-third of the average
GDP per capita of the countries of the European Union (27), with unemployment
rate among the highest in Europe (31.8% in the last quarter of 2011), employment
rate among the lowest (38.5%), and an extreme poverty rate (14.7% in 2010) (The
World Bank 2012: 33). This is not a good starting position.
Croatia and Estonia are following a completely different development path
than the other selected countries. Their growth rates are very dynamic. Both expe-
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rienced a lot of problems in 2007 (Estonia) and 2008 (Croatia), sharing similar cri-
sis problems with almost all the other European countries. According to Bartlett –
Prica (2012), countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, and Romania, that
have made more progress in transition, have a higher degree of EU integration and
a higher “quality of institutions”, they have experienced the highest rate of nega-
tive growth of GDP over the two-year period of 2009–2010. Hence, their progress
in adopting market-friendly institutions has simultaneously increased their vul-
nerability to external shocks. On the other hand, countries that have made lower
institutional progress were less affected by the external shock of the global eco-
nomic crisis.
Macedonia had a better starting position (1998–2001) than Albania, Bulgaria,
Serbia, or even Romania in some periods. After 2001, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
growth rates per capita became much higher than those of Macedonia, Serbia, and
Albania. These lower growth rates per capita can largely be attributed to a higher
population growth, but a lot of other factors must also be examined in order to dis-
cover why Macedonia had such a development swing. The higher the popula-
tion’s growth rates, the higher the productive efforts of the country need to be in
order to provide the same growth rate as other countries with a modest or lower
population growth.
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Figure 1. GDP per capita of the selected countries (constant 2000 US$)
Source: Calculations based on the World Bank database (http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/
home.do?Step=1&id=4).
It is obvious that Macedonia needs to make a much bigger development effort
(“to run faster”) than all other analysed countries in order to compensate for the
higher population growth. All other selected countries had even significant nega-
tive population growth rates, which acted as a sort of strong tailwind for them.
Almost all the analysed countries have fluctuations in gross fixed capital in-
vestments in a range between 20 and 25%; however, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania,
and Croatia record horrendously higher rates. These countries have the highest
per capita growth rates as well. Macedonia had significantly lower share of the
gross fixed capital investments in GDP. The intensity of the investments was not
much higher even during the years of prosperity (2007 and 2008).
In addition, concerning the investment sources, Macedonian domestic savings
is among the lowest in the group of the designated countries (5–6% of GDP) simi-
larly as in Albania and Serbia. The other group (Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, and
Croatia) have domestic savings rates between 20 and 25% of GDP. If we consider
the Albanian big savings crisis in 1992, as a result of collapsing pyramid savings
schemes, we might even say that the Albanian buoyant domestic savings is fol-
lowing very dynamic rates. Macedonian domestic savings has continually fallen
from the early 1990s to the present. That is a worrisome fact, especially because
domestic savings should be the most important investments source with the big-
gest multiplication effect on growth. On the other hand, the savings volume could
be considered as an indication of citizen’s confidence and belief in the country’s
future.
The surging trend of domestic savings in Slovenia and Estonia contrasts
sharply with the down-sloping trend of the Macedonian savings.
When domestic savings are insufficient, investments need some other source.
That could be foreign direct investments (FDI). However, the net inflow of FDI
(1990–2011), as a contribution to GDP, is extremely unpredictable in all analysed
countries, without significant difference from country to country (except in
Montenegro with an extreme 25% of GDP). In most of the countries, their share is
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Table 1
Population growth rates of selected countries (%)
Albania Bulgaria Croatia Estonia Macedonia Romania
1980–1990 –2.10 –0.11 0.40 0.60 0.65 0.44
1991–2000 –0.68 –0.65 –0.77 –1.36 0.51 –0.33
2001–2011 0.41 –0.81 –0.04 –0.20 0.24 –0.44
Average –0.59 –0.52 –0.14 –0.32 0.47 –0.11
Source: Personal calculations based on the World Bank dataset http://databank.worldbank.org/
ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4
between 4–5% (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia), while it is
higher in Bulgaria (7.4%) and Estonia (8%). In the middle-income countries, the
average share of FDI in GDP is about 1.8%, while in the high-income countries, it
is approximately 2.4%. The higher average share in Bulgaria and Estonia is a re-
sult of the unexpected rise in one single year (31% of GDP in Bulgaria in 2007 and
21% of GDP in Estonia in 2005), which could be a result of the privatisation of
some energy infrastructure or telecommunication firms (Bartlett – Prica 2012:
13). In Macedonia, there are some sudden jumps in foreign direct investments in
1998, as a result of the sale of several companies to foreign investors, e.g. the sale
of the Telecom Company in 2000 (ca. 13% of GDP) and of the electricity distribu-
tion company in 2006/7 (6 and 8.5% of GDP). “FDI in FYR Macedonia also dou-
bled as a share of GDP and on a per capita basis. Car parts in the industrial sector
(Serbia, FYR Macedonia) as well as financial and agricultural sectors (FYR Mac-
edonia) were the most successful sectors in attracting FDI” (The World Bank
2012: 10). In the last few years, the average rate of FDI in Macedonia is slightly
higher, as the calculation methodology was changed.
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Figure 2. Gross domestic savings in Macedonia, Slovenia and Estonia in GDP
Source: Calculations based on the World Bank Database (http://databank.worldbank.org/
ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4)
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND GROWTH
In many developed countries, agriculture and other primary production sector di-
visions (forestry, hunting and fishing) contribute 1–2% to GDP, the secondary
sector (mining, industry and construction) 25–35%, and the tertiary sector (ser-
vices, trade, information, banking, insurance) 70–75%. In developed countries’
industry, manufacturing is significantly developed and absorbs a great part of the
labour force. In developing countries, the share of agriculture is significant (e.g.
Albania). However, the trend has been improving in the last few years. In 1995, in
Albania, the primary sector contributed almost 55% to GDP, whereas 20% in
2010. Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Serbia sharply reduced the agricultural
share in GDP to 5–7%, but the Macedonian primary sector has a stagnating trend
at the level of 12–13%.3 The Macedonian agricultural sector is employing
19–20% of the country’s labour force.
The secondary sector has the lowest share in Albania (which is to be expected
as a result of the high input of the primary sector). The share in all the other ana-
lysed countries is between 25 and 28%. Only Bulgaria has a share between 32 and
34%. The Macedonian secondary sector’s contribution to GDP is about 28%. It is
important to underline that the middle- and higher-income level countries need a
developed industry and manufacture, among other reasons because this sector is
the main employer of the average educated part of the population. In Macedonia,
the industry employs between 32 and 33% of the labour force.
The tertiary sector dominates in Croatia and Romania (65–67%), followed by
Bulgaria and Serbia 63–65%, and finally the lowest share is in Albania and Mace-
donia (60–61%). Approximately 50% of the total labour force in Macedonia is
employed in the service sector. An especially important indicator for the develop-
ment status of a national economy is the participation of trade as a share in total
services. In the richest countries, banking, IT and insurance contribute the most to
the GDP from services. However, if trade dominates the services, it could be an
indication of underdevelopment. The proportionally high participation of trade
means that atomised economic agents (citizens) are seeking an easy source of in-
come (it is cheapest to open a store and to try to trade something). In developed
countries, this indicator is between 10 and 13% (Germany: 13%, Greece: 20%,
European Union: 16–18%). In the group of countries selected here, Romania has
the lowest share of trade (10–12%), and Albania the highest (35–40%). All other
countries try to maintain the trend of having the share of trade between 20 and
25%. The same applies to Macedonia.
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3 According the World Bank database, agricultural production (12.4%) is slightly higher in
comparison with the data from Macedonian State Statistical office (10.4%), but the level from
both sources is very high.
The export of high technology is an important factor, too, as the higher the par-
ticipation of hi-tech in the export of all produced industrial products, the more de-
veloped the country is. Estonia is a specific case (with a population of 1.2 mil-
lion), which exports high technology accounting for over 10% of the GDP (in
some years such as 2000, even 30%). All other countries have a participation be-
tween 6 and 8%. Unfortunately, the Macedonian trend is negative. It fell from 3%
in 1995 to 1.4% in 2004 and to 0.8% in 2007.
Macedonian denar is pegged to the euro
Even the most productive economies such as Germany are facing problems with
international competition, especially if the import is based on a cheap workforce
(Truett – Truett 2012). International trade as a share of GDP is highest in Estonia
(between 160 and 180%), followed by Bulgaria with 90–135%. Macedonian ex-
port is between 25 and 50% of GDP, but import was always significantly higher in
the whole analysed period, which is why Macedonia had a significant trade deficit
(between 10–25% of GDP). It is important to underline that 10–25% of all import
refers to crude oil. Macedonia imports 40–50% of its energy needs. Macedonia is
an import-dependent country. The participation of food in export and import is de-
clining from year to year, with non-food products becoming dominant. In Mace-
donian export, the largest part consists of catalysts with precious metals or pre-
cious metal compounds as the active substance, ferronickel, iron, and steel prod-
ucts (flat-rolled products), clothes, and petroleum oil derivatives. Among imports,
the most significant products are platinum alloys, unwrought or in powder form,
crude petroleum oils, motor vehicles, and electricity. Clearly, Macedonian export
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Table 2
Macedonian GDP structure in 2011 (constant prices – 2005)
Production activities Million denars %
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 36,740 10.1
Mining, manufacturing, electricity 63,943 17.6
Construction 19,783 5.5
Wholesale, retail trade 52,580 14.5
Hotels and restaurants 4,897 1.4
Transport and storage 32,048 8.8
Financial intermediation and other services 54,984 15.2
Public administration, social security, education 48,295 13.3
Net taxes 48,772 13.4
GDP 314,045 100.0
Source: State Statistical Office, 2012.
depends on import, explaining why GDP is not particularly affected in the reces-
sion periods. The decrease in exports should decrease the imports, too, so there is
no major negative effect on GDP. Yet, the negative effects are more significant in
the real sector. When the export industry shrinks, it hinders final consumption and
employment (and, indirectly, GDP). Albania has the worst position with the high-
est trade deficit (between 15 and 27% of GDP). Trade deficit in Albania had an ex-
treme value in 1992 (77% of GDP). Several scholars have argued that export-led
development needs to be replaced with the models underpinned by domestic de-
mand (Blanchard – Milesi-Ferretti 2009). In Macedonia, the trade deficit is cov-
ered by the workers’ remittances balancing the current account. If remittances are
not sufficient, foreign exchange reserves need to offset the current account deficit,
or the capital account needs to be increased (foreign loans). Export-led growth
countries continually devaluate their local currency in order to encourage export
(and discourage import). All the analysed countries have different exchange rate
regimes: currency board in Bulgaria, floating exchange rate in Albania, controlled
floats in Croatia and Serbia. The Macedonian denar is pegged to the euro (it was
previously pegged to the German mark) and currency devaluation to stimulate ex-
port growth is not possible. That could affect growth rates too.
High remittances inflow
The Macedonian current account deficit during the whole analysed period is vola-
tile (starting from 0%, –10% and –8% in 2002, and –12.5% in 2008). In the past
few years, the current account deficit has been relatively stable (around –5 to
–6%). The most important role for the stability of the current account deficit is
played by remittances. According to the World Bank database, the remittances are
3.8–4.3% of GDP, which is too low in comparison with reality and the Macedo-
nian Central Bank data. Maybe the difference is significant because the World
Bank is considering only the official transfers (through banks and official money
transfer channels) as relevant, which could reach USD 170 to 410 million. The
Macedonian Central Bank is calculating a much higher amount (USD 1.1–1.5 bil-
lion), which could be 15–16% of GDP.4 In addition, the World Bank considers re-
mittances’ underestimation for Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro (The World
Bank 2012). The high amounts of remittances are considered as a massive benefit
for Macedonian economy. On the other hand, the remittances are the basic reason
why the Central Bank does not implement an active foreign currency policy (in
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4 Bucevska – Bucevska (2009) argue that the volume of remittances in Macedonia are highly
disputed. According to their calculation, remittances are reaching 14% of GDP.
addition to the fear of psychologically inspired inflation), which might encourage
export and improve the economic structure (quality, competitive advantage, new
design, etc.) in the country. It is normal for countries with lower incomes to have a
high share of remittances in their GDP. A part of the remittances comes from
workers recently employed in Iraq and Afghanistan (part of whom are still on the
unemployment list in Macedonian employment agency).
Government consumption
Macedonia’s central government debt was about 22–26% of GDP in the last
two–three years. That is why the debt does not create many problems for the Mac-
edonian economy. It could be generally concluded that the Macedonian public
debt is still controllable with common fiscal instruments. It is much more impor-
tant to analyse what the public spending is used for and whether it helps the econ-
omy to increase its overall output, especially in the current crisis period. Public
spending is a much-studied theme in the multitude of research on the influence of
government spending on growth, with diverse results in latest years. Some are
based on endogenous models initially oriented to growth models with productive
public spending. There is quite a lot of scientific evidence that public investment
in infrastructure, health, and education affects production and influences overall
growth dynamics (Agenor – Neanidis 2011; Tamoya 2012). There are studies
which argue that public spending has a strong impact not only on crowding-out ef-
fect (Bairam – Ward 1993; Kitaoka 2002), but also that there is a strong crowd-
ing-in effect (Aschauer 1989; Argimon et al. 1997; Ambler et al. 2010; Hatano
2010). Sometimes, the basic hypothesis is to discover the most accepted public
debt participation in GDP (assuming that public debt must not exceed a certain
percentage, as in the European Union). Also, “the magnitude of the target level of
long-term debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this
type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments” (Von
Thadden – Vidal 2010: 923). At times, discovering the critical level of debt be-
yond which the sustainability is no longer possible is the central theme. Most stud-
ies consider balanced budget and exercising the budgetary rule when debt grows
less than GDP and gives a higher long-term growth rate, compared with the situa-
tion when debt grows at the same rate as GDP (Greiner 2011).
Albanian final government consumption expenditure is about 10% of GDP,
representing the lowest share. In all the other analysed countries, government con-
sumption is much higher (between 15 and 23%). Macedonian general government
final consumption expenditure is in the same range, except in the “military” in
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2001 (25%). That represents a confirmation about diverse tendencies, which pre-
vailed in most of the OECD countries and Macedonia. In most countries, “Gov-
ernment debt has increased significantly, mechanically offsetting the decline in
private debt which has taken place since the start of the crisis – the so called
deleveraging process” (Torres 2010: 233). However, some of the research results
are adverse regarding the effects of government spending on output growth: “as
long as either fiscal or monetary policies affect the investment decisions of indi-
viduals, greater variability in these policies will enhance growth, as greater uncer-
tainty associated with them induces individuals to undertake precautionary in-
vestment in either physical capital or human capital” (Varvarigos 2006: 299). Yet,
most of the results found that the relationship between policy volatility and eco-
nomic growth is negative. The research results are almost unanimous in their con-
clusion that it is very important where government investments are used: “it is as-
sumed that government spending is used to enhance the productivity of the output
sector” (Barro 1990) or the educational sector, the overall effects that policy vari-
ables transmit in long-term growth rate become substantially richer than in situa-
tions where government spending is used purely unproductively (e.g. government
consumption or transfer payments) (Varvarigos 2006). Regarding the short-term
effects of government spending, most researchers conclude that productive gov-
ernment spending (infrastructure, education, health, unemployment) has a signifi-
cant influence, especially in periods of severe downturns (Furceri – Zdzienicka
2012). Social spending also has positive effects on private consumption, while it
has negligible effects on private investment. It needs to be stressed that social
spending as a share of GDP has shown an upward trend in almost every country in
the world in the past years, especially in high-income countries. In the last couple
of years, the Macedonian final government consumption was between 17 and
19% of GDP (high-income countries have an average share of final government
consumption between 16 and 18%, e.g. Germany 20% and the European Union
even higher than 22% in the last few years, while in middle-income countries it is
12–13%). Croatia, Estonia, and Serbia have significantly higher government con-
sumption in GDP.
In 2011, the government focused on construction activities. That triggered the
GDP ahead for a while. “However, construction activity remains weak in
Montenegro, plagued by weak credit recovery and institutional constraints in the
sector. FYR Macedonia appears to be an exception to this pattern, with construc-
tion contributing significantly to growth in 2011” (The World Bank 2012: 6).
In 2012, construction in Macedonia fell significantly, one of the reasons for
that being the government response (reducing capital investments) to the forth-
coming crisis in the European Union’s countries, especially in Macedonia’s major
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trading partners (Germany, Italy, Serbia, and Greece). The current Macedonian
government debt level is about 23% of the GDP, one of the lowest debt levels in
Europe.
REGRESSION AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Correlation coefficients are calculated for all the indicators and the GDP per ca-
pita for each of the selected countries (see Appendix 1). The goal was to detect
similar relations or differences between the analysed countries and to try to give
reasons. For instance, the correlation coefficients for final domestic savings and
household final consumption (both as a percentage of GDP) have an opposite di-
rection in all the analysed countries.5 The first has a correlation coefficient with a
negative sign, and the other a positive one, or vice versa. When the correlation co-
efficient between final domestic savings and GDP per capita is negative (high-in-
come countries), the correlation coefficient for household final consumption and
GDP per capita is positive. Other countries (Germany, Slovenia, Estonia, Croatia,
and middle-income countries) have a positive correlation coefficient for final do-
mestic savings and a negative one for household final consumption. A possible
explanation could be that the GDP of high-income countries is more dependent on
domestic consumption. All the mentioned other countries are more oriented to-
wards exports and investments (except Serbia). The correlation coefficients for
both exports and imports (and GDP per capita) are highly positive (and signifi-
cant) for all the analysed countries, indicating that international trade is extremely
important for GDP per capita growth.
The high-income countries and the European Union have very high negative
correlation coefficients for accumulated government debts and GDP per capita.
The higher debts are hampering growth rates. That is not the case for Greece,
which has a high positive correlation coefficient, indicating the high dependence
of the growth rates on government debts. Unfortunately, these data are lacking for
the other countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, middle-income countries, Mace-
donia, and Serbia).6
Fixed capital formation (as a % of GDP) shows negative correlation for high-in-
come countries, the European Union and Germany (not significant for Serbia), but
very high positive coefficients for all the other countries (Macedonia, Croatia, Ro-
mania, and Slovenia). Fixed capital formation has negative coefficients with house-
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5 An exception is noticed for the European Union and Greece where one of the indicators (sav-
ings or households consumption) is insignificant.
6 The correlation coefficients for government debt and GDP per capita for Germany, Slovenia,
Estonia, and Albania are not significant at 95%.
hold final consumption in all analysed countries except for Macedonia. From the
other side, more developed countries (high-income and Germany) have negative
correlation coefficients for FDI (highly positive) and fixed capital formation
(highly negative). This may be a result of the changed economic structure in the de-
veloped countries. Massive investments in services have much higher multipliers
on GDP. All the other countries have positive correlation coefficients (moving in
the same direction as GDP per capita), which is to be expected as normal for less de-
veloped countries because they still need a dominant part of the investments to be
oriented towards capital-intensive industries (with a lower multiplier on GDP). It is
important to underline that the industry contribution to GDP has a negative correla-
tion coefficient for all the analysed developed countries, and the service contribu-
tion has significantly positive correlation coefficients on GDP per capita for all the
analysed countries (non-significant for Greece, Estonia, and Macedonia).
The correlation coefficients for remittances and GDP per capita are significant
for the analysed countries. They are significant and very highly positive for
high-income countries, the European Union, Estonia, Romania, middle-income
countries, and Macedonia, but highly negative for Greece, Albania, Serbia, and
Croatia. A possible explanation could be that these diasporas, as a gesture of soli-
darity, send more remittances when their countries of origin are facing more eco-
nomic problems or show the clear signs of deeper recession. The positive correla-
tion for the other countries is a sign that remittances are part of the normal behav-
iour of the people working abroad. They send remittances regularly to their fami-
lies, which are used for their everyday consumption, and have a significant and
positive impact on the country’s GDP per capita: the higher the remittances, the
higher the GDP per capita.
A regression is generated for all the selected countries in the following form:7
GDP pc = b1 + b2*Fdi + b3*Grfxcap + b4*Grdsv + b5*Houcon + b6*Popgr +
+ b7*Ser + b8*Remitt
8
The model is significant at the 99% level for all the countries except Serbia
(Appendix 2).
The regression is highly significant and could provide a good basis for conclu-
sions and comparisons. For high-income countries, there are several drivers posi-
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7 For Serbia, the SPSS program removed all the independent variables as insignificant, except
for remittances, foreign direct investments and exports, and it was excluded from the regres-
sion analysis. For Greece, there are no data for services and we included trade instead, while
for Albania, there were no data for import participation in the GDP.
8 Fdi – foreign direct investments as % of GDP; Grfxcap – Gross fixed capital formation; Grdsv
– gross domestic savings as % of GDP; Houcon – households’ final consumption expenditures
as % of GDP; Popgr – population growth rate; Ser – participation of the services in GDP (%);
Remitt – remittances as % of GDP.
tively influencing GDP per capita growth (see Appendix 3), namely gross domes-
tic savings and services, but there are some inhibiting factors, too, namely gross
fixed capital formation and trade deficit.9 All the others are insignificant. For EU
countries, there are several drivers: gross domestic savings, population growth
rate, services participation in GDP, and remittances. Negatively influencing fac-
tors are gross fixed capital formation and trade deficit, the same as in the case of
high-income countries. The only negative influence factors for the middle-in-
come countries are foreign direct investments. One factor influencing growth is
service contribution to GDP. For Estonia, imports, population growth, and remit-
tances are important driving factors. The inhibiting factors are gross domestic
savings and household final consumption share in GDP.
For Macedonia, there is only one detected significant driving factor: the %
share of gross domestic savings in GDP. There is significant registered negative
influence of population growth rates. Macedonian GDP growth rates have to be
higher (“to run faster”) to compensate high population growth rates.
Generally the most dominant positive growth factors are services participation
in GDP, gross domestic savings, and population growth (for most of the countries
except for Macedonia), while negative factors are recognised trade deficit and
gross fixed capital formation. A lagged indicator was not used in the model. It is
possible that fixed capital formation would have a positive influence if it were
lagged for one year to express the dynamic of influence (not the static influence as
in this approach).
Other possible growth drivers or inhibitors
No single factor has been detected that was significantly important for the growth
of higher-income countries. They all have their own development path, which
cannot be accepted as a universal recipe for all other countries. Development is
possible in a unique, genuine way, putting the focus on the cheaper and available
growth factors creating an original economic history and development path. Ev-
ery country has to underpin its own clearly defined long-term development priori-
ties, sometimes starting with a sub-optimal economic structure, low income, and
the high pressure of the young population who leave the country looking for jobs
or better living conditions.
It becomes obvious that besides the sub-optimal economic structure and low
domestic savings, the sources of the decay of development in Macedonia (and
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9 Some of the results are contradictory from the point of view of traditionally accepted logic.
However, we are describing the results of the regression analysis as results only, without enter-
ing into the deeper logic of factor analysis.
some other neighbouring countries included in the analysis) need to be sought in
factors and drivers outside the economic sphere. For example, the “Bribery In-
dex” (from the World Bank Enterprise Survey) is highest in Albania (22%), fol-
lowed by Romania (14.7%), Macedonia (9.7%), and Bulgaria (8.2%). In the other
countries (Croatia, Slovenia and Estonia), this index is much lower (1–3%). In the
same database, there is a survey on “Governance Indicators” and a good many
other additional quality indicators could be selected for comparison. According to
the “Regulatory Quality” indicator, Estonia can be ranked highest, followed by
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania (but with significantly worse results than Esto-
nia). The lowest places could be allocated to Macedonia, Albania, and Serbia
(only Macedonia has a negative coefficient). According to the “Rule of Law” in-
dicator, the countries could be ranked in the same order. Estonia is ranked way
much higher than all the other analysed countries, and its trend is moving signifi-
cantly upwards. All the other countries are in the negative zone, except Croatia
and Romania in the last few years. Macedonia is in the negative zone with Bul-
garia, Serbia, and Albania. Similar results could be extracted for the “Corruption
Control” and “Government Effectiveness” indicators. The first place is always oc-
cupied by Estonia, followed by Romania and Croatia, while the worst results can
be assigned to Macedonia, Serbia, and Albania.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is obvious that Estonia is the most successful country among the analysed coun-
tries. The reason for its fast growth was not an extraordinary natural endowment,
or special development conditions and circumstances. The reasons for the growth
could be partly attributed to the friendly neighbouring environment and to the ca-
pability and will of the politicians, who knew the long-term priorities of the citi-
zens. All the other analysed countries, including Macedonia, have vacillated in
defining the strategic long-term economic, social, and political priorities during
the entire transition period (after 1998). That is why populist ideas have prevailed
and the usual political practice is to create a make-believe reality (Shukarov 2012:
127), a virtual economic world; to circulate widespread information that all the
other countries have significant problems; and to conceal the developmental de-
cay in comparison with other similar countries. The countries that joined the Eu-
ropean Union in the last few years (Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia) became fully
aware of this and have left behind the vicious circle of demagogy and populism,
which is why they have started showing signs of development more lately.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1
Correlation coefficients with GDP per capita for the selected countries
Code Trade FDI Savings Household Fixed Population Services Remit-
deficit consump- capitali- growth tances
tion sation
High-income –0.7908 0.6867 –0.7538 0.8473 –0.5632 –0.6032 0.9463 0.7052
EU 0.2349 0.6521 –0.0693 –0.4271 –0.2774 0.5653 0.9345 0.9194
Germany 0.9155 0.2316 0.3573 –0.2733 –0.8685 –0.8879 0.8246 0.5609
Greece –0.2683 0.0399 –0.1604 –0.4562 0.4237 –0.7680 –0.9496
Slovenia –0.3525 0.2642 0.7522 –0.7445 0.7178 0.7636 0.8535 –0.3879
Estonia 0.2948 0.5567 0.8945 –0.6085 0.3389 0.8805 0.9160
Romania –0.6624 0.5079 0.4434 –0.5606 0.9253 0.2177 0.8073 0.8389
Bulgaria –0.7271 0.6156 0.4965 –0.6200 0.9511 0.2304 0.6694 0.4005
Croatia –0.1597 0.6208 0.8567 –0.5181 0.9210 –0.1616 0.8385 –0.5339
Middle-income 0.5948 0.6767 0.8519 –0.9211 0.7997 –0.8565 0.7542 0.7814
Macedonia –0.7505 0.1503 –0.3249 0.6009 0.8120 –0.8556 0.7571 0.8675
Serbia –0.2872 –0.3843 –0.4798 0.8081 –0.1700 –0.6558 –0.0031 –0.6724
Albania 0.4522 0.7348 0.6237 –0.5908 0.8569 0.8563 0.8408 –0.732
Source: Calculations based on World Bank dataset.
Appendix 2
Regression analysis results for the selected countries
R square Adj. R square Prob. F d/w
High-income 0.997 0.995 0.000 2.1
EU 0.994 0.989 0.000 1.7
Germany 0.983 0.969 0.000 2.7
Greece 0.934 0.896 0.000 1.2
Middle-income 0.973 0.955 0.000 2.0
Slovenia 0.987 0.975 0.000 1.2
Bulgaria 0.989 0.974 0.000 2.5
Romania 0.978 0.956 0.000 1.7
Estonia 0.980 0.962 0.000 2.3
Croatia 0.967 0.938 0.000 1.6
Macedonia 0.984 0.962 0.001 2.3
Serbia 1
Albania 0.976 0.957 0.000 2.4
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita.
Source: Calculations based on the World Bank data set.
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Appendix 4
Correlation and regression results
MACEDONIA
| gdppc fdi grdomsav grfixcap houscons popgrow service remitt
gdppc | 1.0000
fdi | 0.1503 1.0000
grdomsav | –0.3249 –0.2193 1.0000
grfixcap | 0.8120 –0.1369 –0.1294 1.0000
houscons | 0.6009 –0.0086 –0.7944 0.5028 1.0000
popgrow | –0.8556 –0.2290 0.6602 –0.5005 –0.7458 1.0000
service | 0.7571 0.0011 –0.5005 0.5046 0.6472 –0.8755 1.0000
remitt | 0.8675 0.1115 –0.5973 0.6100 0.8077 –0.9572 0.8432 1.0000
netexp | –0.7505 –0.1663 0.8037 –0.6496 –0.8589 0.8062 –0.6448 –0.7913
|netexp
netexp | 1.0000
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 15
F(8,6) = 45.74
Model | 700627.612 8 87578.4514 Prob > F = 0.0001
Residual | 11488.2822 6 1914.71369 R-squared = 0.9839
Total | 712115.894 14 50865.421 Adj R-squared = 0.9624
Root MSE = 43.757
gdppc | Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
lgfdi | 9.989372 18.2477 0.55 0.604 –34.66113 54.63988
grdomsav | 38.69082 16.8166 2.30 0.061 –2.457908 79.83954
grfixcap | 47.45354 28.72273 1.65 0.150 –22.82846 117.7355
houscons | 4.880231 12.42306 0.39 0.708 –25.51791 35.27837
popgrow |–2183.094 946.1436 –2.31 0.060 –4498.224 132.0361
service | –8.431557 13.86178 –0.61 0.565 –42.35011 25.487
remitt | –55.9901 81.59632 –0.69 0.518 –255.6491 143.6689
netexp | –13.58631 19.54694 –0.70 0.513 –61.41594 34.24333
_cons | 1576.393 1081.176 1.46 0.195 –1069.15 4221.936
Durbin–Watson d-statistic (9, 15) = 2.280565
Breusch–Pagan / Cook–Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of gdppc
chi2(1) = 0.85
Prob > chi2 = 0.3557
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
lags(p) | chi2 df Prob > chi2
1 | 0.955 1 0.3285
H0: no serial correlation
